Critical Analysis of Flanagan's Moral Naturalism

Document Type : Original Article

Author

استادیار گروه اخلاق، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران

10.30470/er.2022.254966

Abstract

In the article “Naturalization of Morality”, Flanagan explains a kind of moral naturalism and considers the most sensible kind of moral naturalism to be neo-compatibilism. According to this kind of naturalism, free will is compatible with determinism, but this is not in conflict with the moral responsibility; however, it is along with a kind of scientific determinism. In his article, Flanagan responds to Hume and Moore's critique of moral naturalism. He does not shy away from his desired moral naturalism leading to a kind of relativism and nihilism; because in any case, he considers value and goodness to be related to humans and their ecology. The present study first reports on the nature of moral naturalism in Flanagan’s thought. In the following, the cases of strengthening and criticizing Flanagan’s point of view by Casebeer, Ruse, and Railton will be discussed. Finally, ontological, epistemological, and motivational criticisms, as well as criticisms aimed at accepting relativism and moral nihilism on the nature of naturalism considered by Flanagan will be presented.

Keywords


Article Title [Persian]

تحلیل انتقادی طبیعت‌گرائی اخلاقی مورد نظر فلانگان

Author [Persian]

  • بهروز محمدی منفرد
Assistant Professor, Department of Ethics, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
Abstract [Persian]

فلانگان در مقاله طبیعی کردن اخلاق، نوعی طبیعت‌گرائی اخلاقی را تبیین نموده و معقول‌ترین گونه طبیعت-گرائی اخلاقی را نوسازگارگرائی می‌داند. براساس این نوع طبیعت‌گرائی، اراده آزاد با تعیّن‌گرائی سازگار بوده و شاهد نوعی تعیّن‌گرائی علمی، در عین مسئولیت اخلاقی خواهیم بود. فلانگان در مقاله خود نقدهای هیوم و مور در مقابل طبیعت‌گرائی اخلاقی را پاسخ می‌دهند و از منتهی شدن طبیعت‌گرائی اخلاقی مورد نظر خویش به نوعی نسبیت‌گرائی و نیهیلیسم ابائی ندارد، زیرا در هر حال ارزش و خوبی را وابسته به انسان و اکولوژی آن می‌دانند. پژوهش حاضر ابتدا گزارشی از ماهیت طبیعی‌گرائی اخلاقی در اندیشه فلانگان بیان می‌کند. در ادامه از موارد تقویت و نقد کسبییر و راس و ریلتن در قبال دیدگاه فلانگان سخن گفته می‌شود و در نهایت نقدهائی هستی‌شناسانه، معرفت‌شناسانه و انگیزشی و همچنین نقدهائی معطوف به پذیرش نسبی‌گرائی و نیهیلیسم اخلاقی بر ماهیت طبیعت‌گرائی اخلاقی مورد نظر فلانگان ارائه می‌شود.

Keywords [Persian]

  • فلانگان
  • طبیعت‌گرائی اخلاقی
  • اراده آزاد
  • تعین‌گرائی
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Volume 3, Issue 3 - Serial Number 11
September 2022
Pages 27-46
  • Receive Date: 04 June 2022
  • Revise Date: 01 August 2022
  • Accept Date: 28 September 2022
  • First Publish Date: 28 September 2022