Kant and the Relationship Between the Fact of Reason and The Deduction of Moral Principles

Bagheri Mohamadabadi, Arash; Zali, Mustafa

doi:10.30470/er.2024.2025805.1315

Kant and the Relationship Between the Fact of Reason and The Deduction of Moral Principles

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

Arash Bagheri Mohamadabadi ¹

Mustafa Zali ²

¹ PhD Student, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.

² Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.

10.30470/er.2024.2025805.1315

Abstract

Kant divides judgments into four classes (synthetic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, analytic a priori, analytic a posteriori) and considers the first three classes as possible. However, the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments requires justification because these judgments are not justified as necessary and universal judgments by mere analysis of concepts - as opposed to analytic a priori judgments - or by reference to experience - as opposed to synthetic a posteriori judgment. In his critical system, Kant attempts to justify the validity of this kind of judgment by a "legal" process called "deduction," and he does this for both theoretical and practical judgments. But about practical judgments, he uses a doctrine called "the fact of reason", which implies direct awareness of moral principles and moral consciousness in general. However, the role of this doctrine in justifying synthetic a priori judgments has been disputed by commentators, some of whom have seen Kant's proposal of this doctrine as a retreat from the deduction of moral principles. In contrast, this article shows that Kant does not avoid the deduction of moral principles, but that this doctrine is part of the process of 'deducing' these judgments as a legal process.

Keywords

Kant

Moral Law

Deduction

fact of reason

synthetic a priori

Critique of Practical Reason

Subjects

Meta Ethics

Article Title Persian

نسبت میان واقعیت عقل و استنتاج قانون اخلاق نزد کانت

Authors Persian

آرش باقری محمد ابادی ¹

مصطفی زالی ²

¹ دانشجوی دکترای فلسفه دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.

² استادیار گروه فلسفه دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.

Abstract Persian

کانت در یک حصر عقلی، احکام را به چهار دسته تقسیم می‌کند و سه دسته احکام «تحلیلی پیشینی»، «ترکیبی پیشینی» و «ترکیبی پسینی» را از بین آنها ممکن می‌شمارد. دراین‌میان احکام ترکیبی پیشینی احکامی هستند که امکان آنها نیازمند توجیه است؛ چراکه این احکام به عنوان احکام ضروری و کلی با صرف تحلیل مفاهیم - بر خلاف احکام تحلیلی پیشینی - یا رجوع به تجربه - بر خلاف احکام ترکیبی پسینی- موجه نمی شوند. کانت در نظام نقادی‌اش با طی فرایندی «حقوقی» با عنوان «استنتاج» می‌خواهد اعتبار این نوع از احکام را روشن کند و این کار را هم دربارۀ احکام ترکیبی پیشینی در ساحت نظر یعنی متافیزیک و علوم و هم دربارۀ احکام ترکیبی پیشینی در ساحت عمل یعنی ساحت اخلاق انجام دهد. او در نسبت با احکام ترکیبی پیشینی در ساحت اخلاق، آموزه‌ای تحت عنوان «واقعیت عقل» را به کار می‌گیرد که بر آگاهی بی‌واسطه از اصول اخلاقی و آگاهی اخلاقی به‌طورکلی دلالت دارد؛ اما بر سر نقش این آموزه در مقام توجیه احکام ترکیبی پیشینی، میان مفسران نزاع درگرفته است؛ به‌گونه‌ای‌که برخی طرح این آموزه از جانب کانت را به معنای عقب‌نشینی او از استنتاج اصول اخلاقی دانسته‌اند. این نوشتار درمقابل نشان می‌دهد این آموزه بخشی از فرایند «استنتاج» این احکام در مقام فرایندی حقوقی است و کانت به‌هیچ‌وجه از استنتاج اصل برین اخلاق دست نمی‌کشد.

Keywords Persian

کانت

قانون اخلاق

استنتاج

واقعیت عقل

ترکیبی پیشینی

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