Ethical Reflections

Ethical Reflections

An Analysis of the Relationship Between Law and Morality from Hart and Dworkin's Point of View

Document Type : Original Article

Author
Mohammad Rezaei
Assistant Professor of Islamic Theology, Islamic Azad University, Ardebil Branch, Ardebil, Iran
10.30470/er.2023.2007484.1235
Abstract
This article was written with the aim of investigating the relationship between Law and Morality in Hart and Dworkin's thought. The results of the research indicated that according to Hart, law and Morality can be related in two ways. One is Transverse, which includes the acceptance of morality principles in the Rule of recognition and compliance with the minimum content of the laws from a morality point of view. The other is the Inherent relationship, which was the observance of the formal justice of the law, which meant similar treatment with similar cases. Such an attitude is not incompatible with the principles of positivism because it is only a formal aspect. On the other hand, according to Dworkin, in Hard legal cases, the judge has to solve the issue through the principles and values that are the basis and fundamental area of the legal system. In such cases, the judge examines the case and issues a final decision by resorting to appropriate principles and morality values. In addition, in Hard legal cases, the judge's role is not only to apply the laws, but his duty is to interpret the laws. The judge should try to understand the principles and values in such a way that the coherence and integrity of the legal system, that is, the coordination of laws, principles and values, is observed. Based on this, both Hart and Dworkin acknowledged the role of morality in law, however, they differed in their analysis and approach to this issue.
Keywords
Law
Morality
Rule of Recognition
Hard cases
Principles and Values

Subjects

Article Title Persian

تحلیلی بر رابطه قانون و اخلاق از منظر هارت و دورکین

Author Persian

محمد رضائی
استادیار گروه الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، واحد اردبیل، اردبیل، ایران
Abstract Persian

نوشتار حاضر با هدف بررسی رابطهٔ قانون و اخلاق در اندیشهٔ هارت و دورکین نگارش یافت. نتایج تحقیق حاکی از این  بود  که از نظر هارت قانون و اخلاق به دو صورت می‌توانند رابطه داشته باشند. یکی به صورت عرضی که شامل پذیرش اصول اخلاقی در قاعدهٔ رسمیت‌بخش و رعایت محتوای حداقلی قوانین از منظر اخلاقی بود؛ لذا قانون و اخلاق از نظر محتوایی رابطهٔ ذاتی ندارند، بلکه می‌تواند در دو شکل مذکور رابطه داشته باشد. دیگری رابطهٔ ذاتی که همان رعایت عدالت صوری قانون بود که به معنای برخورد مشابه با موارد مشابه بود. چنین نگرشی چون تنها جنبهٔ شکلی دارد با اصول پوزیتیویسم ناسازگاری ندارد. از سوی دیگر از نظر دورکین  قاضی در پرونده‌های دشوار ناگزیر است از طریق اصول و ارزش‌ها که مبنا و ساحت بنیادی نظام حقوقی هستند، موضوع را حل ‌کند. در چنین مواردی قاضی با توسل به اصول و ارزش اخلاقی متناسب، پرونده را بررسی و رأی نهایی صادر می‌کند. ضمن اینکه در پرونده‌های دشوار نقش قاضی تنها تطبیق قوانین نیست؛ بلکه وظیفهٔ او تفسیر قوانین است. قاضی باید تلاش کند اصول و ارزش‌ها را به گونه‌ای فهم و ادراک کند که انسجام و تمامیت نظام حقوقی یعنی هماهنگی قواعد و قوانین به عنوان رو بنا و اصول و ارزش‌ها به‌عنوان زیربنا رعایت شده باشد. بر این اساس، هم هارت و هم دورکین به نقش اخلاق در قانون اذعان داشتند؛ با این حال  میان آن دو در چگونگی تحلیل و نگرش به این موضوع تفاوت وجود دارد.

Keywords Persian

قانون
اخلاق
قاعدهٔ رسمیت بخش
پرونده‌های دشوار
اصول و ارزش‌ها
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  • Receive Date 20 July 2023
  • Revise Date 02 December 2023
  • Accept Date 31 December 2023